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NOTES
ousted of this jurisdiction by defendant's incidental claim that a
certain patent is invalid.
53
Whatever the state court's attitude is toward its diminishing
jurisdiction, the federal tendency, it seems clear, is toward the
position occupied by Judge Clark. Consistent with this is a recent
remedial statute,54 purporting to extend the doctrine of the Hum
case. What effect, if any, this statute will have upon the courts
must remain problematical because in the Kleinman case, where
the statute was sought to be applied, the court distinguished the
case and decided on other grounds.5 It is to be here noted that
the suggested changes embodied in the remedial statute and co-
gently asserted by Judge Clark are pointed in the right direction,
toward much-needed judicial economy for both the litigant and
the court, toward accelerated appellate process and toward greater
liberality in pleading. They cannot, however, of themselves out-
weigh the necessity for retaining wherein possible the constitu-
tional division of jurisdiction between federal and state courts.
The Second Circuit's tenacious resistance to the extension of the
pendent jurisdiction rule, which can only be made at the expense
of state court jurisdiction, is in this respect a healthy safeguard.
DANIEL J. CHAPMAN
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - LIMrrATIONS ON ACTIONS - THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIED TO ACTIONS AGAINST DRAwERs
OF BANK DRAFTS. - Bank drafts are demand instruments drawn
by one bank upon another. They are drawn on funds deposited
in the drawee bank in the same manner as ordinary bank checks,
drawn by individuals. These drafts are used for the immediate
transfer of funds by the issuing bank or by individuals or corpora-
tions who purchase the drafts.
When a bank issues a draft drawn on a correspondent bank,
it immediately credits the account of the drawee for the amount
of the draft. The drawee bank, on the other hand, does not charge
the account of the drawer until the draft is presented and paid.
53. Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897).
54. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. 51338 (b) (Supp. 1948): "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition
when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark
laws. "
55. The court held that there was in fact no unfair competition, the niceties of which
are discussed elsewhere in this note, and "therefore the statute, especially restricted to case
of unfair competition joined with patent, copyright or trademark infringement, did not
apply.
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This means that during the period of time in which the draft
remains unpaid by the drawee, there is a discrepancy between
the asset account of the drawer and the deposit account of the
drawee for the amount of that draft. A considerable number of
these drafts are never presented for payment. It is natural that
issuing banks would like to charge off these unpaid drafts after
a certain period of time and clear their books of these items. This
desire is due to the fact that it becomes impractical to keep rec-
ords which have reached a certain age, that the unpaid drafts
cause increasing discrepancies in accounts with correspondent
banks, and that old unpaid items call for continued, trouble-
some, and often inaccurate accounting and reconciling.
But there is a natural reluctance to charge off these unpaid
drafts unless the drawer is certain that no legal claim may be
based upon them in the future. The best assurance of this would
be the operation of the statute of limitations' to bar the claim of
the holder of a draft against the drawer of that draft after the ex-
piration of a certain period of time. It is the purpose of this note
to examine the question of whether the drawer bank would be
protected in such a manner.
THE NATURE OF THE BANK'S LIABILITY
Before the pursuit of the main inquiry as to the application
of the statute of limitations it will be necessary to determine
whether the fact that a bank draft is issued by a bank will cause
different rules to be applied than those ordinarily applied to ne-
gotiable instruments.
There have occasionally been statements which might raise the
question of whether bank drafts were in the nature of deposits
in the drawer bank. 2 If they were deposits the consequence would
seriously affect this problem. It is generally conceded that the
statute of limitations does not begin to run upon a bank deposit
until a demand has been made against the bank.3 This would
prevent the drawer bank from taking advantage of the statute
1. A typical statute of limitations is the North Dakota statute which provides that:
"The following actions must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has
accrued: 1. An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied
N.D. Rev. Code §28-0116 (1943).
2. Britton, Bills and Notes 776 (1943) (bank instruments serve, in a sense, the same
purpose as deposits). Bank drafts are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
in the same manner as regular deposits. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Related Laws
and Rules and Regulations §326.1 (a) (1951). This regulation was issued by the Board
of Directors of the F.D.I.C. in pursuance to a statute, 12 U.S.C.A. §1813 (1) (Supp. 1951).
3. In re McKeyes' N.W.state, 315 Mich. 369, 24 N.W.2d 155 (1946); Girard Bank v.
Bank of Penn Township, 39 Pa. 92 (1861).
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of limitations until the holder of the draft had made a demand,
the demand had been refused, and the statutory period of limita-
tions had run after the demand and refusal.
4
But there is apparently no legal authority for the proposition
that drafts are deposits, although this appellation has been ap-
plied by courts to several other types of negotiable instruments is-
sued by banks.s However, cashier's checks, certified checks and cer-
tificates of deposit are direct liabilities of the issuing bank and the ac-
counting methods used in most banks treat these instruments, which,
unlike drafts, are often not intended for immediate circulation,
as deposit liabilities, while bank drafts are mere secondary lia-
bilities and are never accounted for as deposit liabilities, but upon
issue are deducted from asset accounts representing balances
with correspondent banks.,
It has generally been ruled that in the eyes of the law, bank
drafts are. the same as ordinary checks, drawn by individuals,
7
and that they are to be treated as checks for the application of
the statute of limitations. 8 In this note cases applying the statute
of limitations to bank drafts and those applying the statute to
ordinary bank checks will be considered together.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Most statutes of limitations9 provide that the actions affected
must be commenced within a certain time after the cause of ac-
tions has accrued. It is immediately apparent that it is difficult
logically to apply this statute in favor of the drawer of an out-
standing bank draft. The reason for this is that under the Uni-
4. Several states have passed statutes providing that abandoned deposits in banks
escheat to the state after a certain period of time. See, for example, Minnesota Stat. Ann.
§48.521-528 (1945). This statute was applied in State v. Northwestern Nat. Bank of
Minneapolis, 219 Minn. 471, 18 N.W.2d 569 (1945) to certificates of deposit and
cashier's checks issued by a bank.
5. State v. Northwestern Nat. Bank of Minneapolis, supra note 4 (certificates of deposit).
See Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Walker, 195 Ala. 552, 70 So. 754, 756 (1916) (applied
to cashier's checks and certified checks stating: ". . . the deposit represented by the
check passes to the credit of the checkholder, who is thereafter a depositor to that amount."
6. Other difficulties might arise. North Dakota, for example, has a statute in its
code chapter entitled "Time for Commencing Actions" which states: "This chapter does
not affect actions to enforce the payment of bills, notes or other evidence of debt,
issued by moneyed corporations, or issued or put in circulation as money." N.D. Rev.
Code §28-0135 (1943). Although this provision could be construed as applying to drafts,
its obvious purpose is to apply to instruments intended to circulate as money, such as bank
notes. No cases upon this statute have been decided, and it could prove to be a real
obstacle to the application o f the statute of limitations to bank drafts in North Dakota.
7. See First Nat. Bank v. Farmers' State Bank, 120 Kan. 706, 244 Pac. 1039,
1040 (1926).
8. See Wrigley v. Farmers' and Merchants' State -Bank, 76. Neb. 862, 108 N.W. 132
(1906).
9. See, for example, the North Dakota statute, supra note 1.
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form Negotiable Instruments Law" the cause of action against
the drawer of a three party instrument does not accrue until the
instrument has been presented for payment to the drawee and
payment has been refused. If the statute is to be applied in favor
of the issuer of a bank draft, a meaning not apparent upon the
face of the statute must be applied.
This problem is a part of a somewhat broader question as to
the application of the statute of limitations to any type of con-
tract in which a demand by the creditor is necessary before he
has a cause of action against the debtor. In any such situation
the statute of limitations would not appear to apply until an
actual demand for payment has been made. But to construe the
statute narrowly would defeat its purpose, which is to bar the
prosecution of stale claims. Most courts faced with this problem
in contract cases have decided that the statute of limitations
would apply, regardless of whether demand has been made, usually
upon the theory that the demand must have been made by the
creditor within a reasonable time and that the reasonable time
was the period of the statute of limitations. After the expiration
of this period the creditor had no rights against the debtor."
Professor Williston 12 quotes with approval Campbell v. Whoris-
key 13 to the effect that when a demand is necessary to perfect
a cause of action it must be made within a reasonable time, that
the nature of the contract determines what is a reasonable time,
but that when there is nothing to indicate that a demand is to be
made quickly or to be delayed, the period of the statute of limita-
tions should be treated as the time within which a demand must
be made. The reasoning in this type of case forms a background
for discussion of the problem in relation to demand negotiable
instruments.1"
In the case of demand notes the statute of limitations is usually
10. 5 U.L.A. Part 2 §70 (1943). N.D. Rev. Code §41-0701 (1943).
11. Caner v. Owners' Realty Co., 33 Cal. App. 479, 165 Pac. 727 (1917). See
Bannitz v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 219 Minn. 235, 17 N.W.2d 372, 373 (1945)
(parties contemplated that demand was to be postponed indefinitely).
12. 6 Williston, Contracts 5720 (Rev..Ed. 1938).
13. 170 Mass. 63, 48 N.E. 1070 (1898).
14. Gossard v. Gossard, 149 F.2d 111, 113 (10th Cir. 1945) discussed the reasoning
in these demand contract cases as follows: "Under one line of authority, the statute of
limitations begins to run upon the making of a demand within a reasonable time, or,
if no demand is shown to have been made, at the expiration of such reasonable time
when a demand will be presumed to have been made. Under another line of authority,
it is held that the cause of action accrues for the purpose of setting the statute in motion
as soon as the promisee by his own act can make the demand payable, and that on the
expiration of thte statutory period thereafter without demand, the action is barred."
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held to run from the date of issue of the note.' 5 This is generally
predicated upon the theory that a demand note is due when is-
sued and a cause of action upon the instrument accrued in favor
of the holder as soon as the note was issued.1" If the premise that
the note is due upon issue is accepted, the holdings that the statute
of limitations runs from the date of issue do no violence to logic.
However, in Palmer v. Palmer 17 where the court held that the
statute of limitations had run in favor of the maker of a demand
note before actual demand had been made, the court applied the
theory somewhat akin to the equitable doctrine of laches, stating
to support its holding that:
"It is no stretch of language to hold that a cause of action
accrues for the purpose of setting the statute in motion as
soon as the creditor by his own act, and in spite of the debtor,
can make the demand payable. . . . Where no delay is con-
templated the rule is just and reasonable; and the present-
ment should be reasonably prompt, or the creditor should
be subjected to the operation of the statute."18
The puxpose sought to be effected by this theory is desirable,
but the reasoning is certainly contrary to the language of the
statute of limitations, seemingly applying the statute of limita-
tions to bar an effective demand.1-
The cases upon checks 20 and drafts introduce an element not
present in the cases on ordinary contracts and demand notes.
This is the necessity of presentment and demand to a third party
before a right of action against the drawer arises. But the courts
have applied much of the reasoning in the contract and note
cases to the check21 and draft cases.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Merchant's Bank v.
State Bank 22 stated, "It (a bank check) is not due until payment
is demanded, and the statute of limitations runs only from that
15. Baird v. Utecht, 67 N.D. 491, 274 N.W. 513 (1937); Rohrig v. Whitney, 234
Iowa 435, 12 N.W.2d 866 (1944).
16. Shuman v. Citizens' State Bank of Rugby, 27 N. D. 599, 147 N.W. 388 (1914)
(statute of limitations not involved).
17. 36 Mich. 487 (1877).
18. Id. at 494.
19. See Note, 22 Ore. L. Rev. 381 (1943) which suggests the somewhat awkward
solution that the parties to a demand note should be presumed to intend that the maker
is liable on the instrument after a reasonable period of time without demand.
20. For a collection of cases dealing with the statute of limitations in regard to checks,
see note, 4 A.L.R. 881 (1919).
21. The Uniform Neg. Inst. Law §186, found in 5 U.L.A. Part 2 §186, N.D. Rev.
Code §41-1703 (1943), provides that a check must be presented within a reasonable
time after issue or its drawer will be discharged to the extent of loss caused by the
delay. Colwell v. Colwell, 92 Ore. 103, 179 Pae. 916 (1919), held that this section
applied when the action was brought within the statute of limitations, but did not operate to
oppose the regular rule of the statute of limitations.
22. 10 Wall. 604, 647 (U.S. 1870).
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time." But this statement was dictum and, although quoted in
dicta in several cases, 23 has apparently never found support in
the holding of any court as to the running of the statute of lim-
itations.
Courts in the United States 24 have several times applied a
variation of the reasoning applied in the contract cases previ-
ously discussed to cases on checks 25 and drafts. They have held
that the statute of limitations begins to run upon the expiration
of a reasonable time after issue of the instrument.
26
In the case of Dolon v. Davidson 27 the court alternatively based
its holding that the statute of limitations ran in favor of the drawer
of a check upon a New York statute which stated that the stat-
ute of limitations ran in such cases from the time when the right
to make the demand was complete. But the court stated that the
qualifying statute was only declaratory of the law and that a
drawer would be entitled to the protection of the statute of lim-
itations without the existence of the qualifying statute, on the
theory that: "the holder of a check should not be permitted to
postpone indefinitely the liability of the maker, by omitting to
present the check for payment."
The theory quoted in the above case, which uses the same rea-
soning as Palmer v. Palmer, 8 was enunciated more recently in
relation to a suit on a bank draft in Dean v. Iowa-Des Moines Nat.
Bank and Trust Co.2 9 where it was stated that:
23. See Citizens' Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 66 Colo. 246, 182 Pac. 12 (1919);
Wright v. MacCarty, 92 111. App. 120, 122 (1900).
24. In England the rule appears to be different. See In re Boyse, 33 Ch. D. 612
(1886), which held that the statute of limitations did not run in favor of the drawer
of a bill of exchange until the bill had been presented for payment.
25. It may be noted that if the drawer does not have sufficient funds in the drawee
bank at the time of the issuing of the check, the holder has an immediate cause of
action against the drawer without the need of presentment to the drawee, and the statute
of limitations runs in favor of the drawer in such a case from the date of issue of the
check. Brush v. Barrett, 82 N.Y. 400 (1880).
26. Colwell v. Colwell, 92 Ore. 103, 179 Pac. 916 (1919) (the reasonable time
expired at the close of the next day's business); Scroggin v. McClelland, 37 Neb. 644,
56 N.W. 208 (1893) (the instrument was a bank draft although called a check in the
case).
27. 16 Misc. 316, 39 N.Y. Supp. 394, atf'd. sub norn. Donlon v. Davidson, 7 App.
Div. 461, 39 N.Y. Supp. 1020 (1896). A recent New York case stated that the statute
of limitations commenced running upon a check from the date of issue, this statement
was made without comment and without mentioning the statute used in the above case.
Farrell v. City of New York, 197 Misc. 1059, 98 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1950).
28. 36 Mich. 487 (1877).
29. 227 Iowa 1289, 281 N.W. 714, 290 N.W. 664 (1940). The question in this case
was the operation of the statute of limitations upon a bank draft, a cashier's check, a
certified check, and a certificate of deposit. In the action upon the draft it was originally
held that the statute of limitations was not a defense since the. cause of action had not
accrued, but upon rehearing the court held that the statute of limitations was a good
defense, using the reasoning quoted above. It was also held that the statute ran on
the cashier's check from date of issue. The defense of the statute of limitations was
not, however, applicable to the certified check and the certificate of deposit, since an
actual demand was necessary to start the statute running on these instruments.
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"It must be conceded that it is the general rule, that plain-
tiff's cause of action has not accrued so as to start the statute
of limitations running, unless all the facts exist so that plain-
tiff can allege a complete cause of action, but there is an ex-
ception controlling in the case at bar. Namely, if the only
act necessary to perfect the plaintiff's cause of action is one
to be performed by the plaintiff and he is under no restraint
or disability in the performance of such act, he cannot .in-
definitely suspend the statute of limitations by delaying per-
formance of the act."30
The cases cited above and the absence of contra holding point
to the fact that the courts in this country support the idea that
the drawer of a check or draft, like the debtor in most other types
of contracts, should be protected by the running of the statute
of limitations, even though the language of the statute seems to
deny such protection. However, it is submitted that the reasons
given to support the desired result are mere rationalizations, and
that the holdings in these cases are not based upon sound logic.
There is nothing in the statute of limitations to support the idea
that it will operate, even though a cause of action has not ac-
crued, upon the expiration of a reasonable period of time, or
when the creditor has it within his power to begin the accrual
of the cause of action. But it is conceded that any new case
decided upon one of these theories will have the support of a
considerable amount of judicial precedent.
It is not the purpose of this note to suggest that one of
these theories is the best, or to propose a new theory rational-
izing the application of the statute of limitations. It is suggested
that the confusion in reasoning may best be resolved by the pas-
sage of legislation which will modify the statute of limitations 31
so that it will apply to cases where the cause of action has not
actually accrued so as to logically permit the application of the
statute. Such legislation might be patterned upon the New York
statute applied in Dolon v. Davidson 12 in favor of the drawer
of a check. The essential part of this statute reads:
30. 227 Iowa 1239, 1261, 290 N.W. 664, 667 (1940). The dissent of Richards, J.
to the opinion on rehearing accuses the majority of applying the doctrine of laches to
a law action. This dissent is a good example of the application of strict logic to the
operation of the statute of limitations in a bank draft case. See 227 Iowa 1239, 1242,
290 N.W. 664, 665 (1940).
31, There may be other solutions. For example, in 1949 a statute was passed in
North Dakota which provided that no action should be brought against a bank on a
debt unless demand be made in writing within six years from the contracting of the
debt. N.D. Rev. Code §6-0824 (Supp. 1949). Although this statute would not affect
bank drafts issued before its passage, it may well be that no remedy will be available
against the drawer of a bank draft issued after the passage of the act unless a written
demand is made upon the bank within six years after the draft is issued.
32. See note 27 supra.
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"Where a right exists, but a demand is necessary to entitle
a person to maintain an action, the time within which the
action must be commenced must be computed from the time
when the right to make the demand is complete ... "33
But even without such legislation it may be concluded that
in any action against the drawer of a bank draft 3 which is com-
menced later than the statutory limit for bringing contract ac-
tions after the issuance of the draft, prior judicial decisions would
strongly support the defense that the statute of limitations would
operate to bar the suit.
JAMES R. PRATr
33. N.Y. Code of Civ. Proc. §410. Stover's N.Y. Code Ann. (2d ed. 1895).
34. The proposed Uniform Commercial Code provides specifically that a cause of action
against the drawer of a draft accrues upon demand following dishonor of the instrument,
Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Text Edition, §3-122 (3)
(Spring, 1951). For a discussion of this section in relation to the statute of limitations
see Tisdale, Uniforyn Commercial Code-Commercial Paper, Part I, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs
252, 270-2 (1950).
